

Session No. 9

Course Title: Theory, Principles and Fundamentals of Hazards, Disasters, and U.S. Emergency Management

Session Title: Historical Overview of U.S. Emergency Management

By: B. Wayne Blanchard

Time: 3 Hours

Objective:

9.1 To better understand the driving events, public pressures, and political and policy outcomes that have shaped emergency management in the United States.

Scope:

To introduce this session, the professor briefly describes the ad hoc event-specific disaster relief of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. Next, the discussion turns to the period of World War II, as civil defense programs were established to make the nation less vulnerable to attack. Then, the session focuses on the fallout shelter era of the early 1960s, with policymakers and citizens aware of progress by the Soviet Union in missile and satellite technology. The professor then presents the evolution of dual-use policy, making wartime-related civil defense resources available for peacetime applications. Discussion includes various natural and technological disasters and media and Congressional scrutiny that provoked pressure for organized Federal assistance. The creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the emphasis on the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) are examined. The emphasis on mitigation, and then the heightened focus on terrorism lead, finally, to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the consequences, so far, for FEMA.

Suggested Student Homework Reading Assignment:

Need to determine specifics.

Additional Sources to Check:

General Requirements:

PowerPoint slides have been prepared to support this session. The session is not dependent upon the utilization of these visual aids. They are provided as a tool that the professor is free to use as PowerPoints or overhead transparencies.

Objective 9.1 To better understand the driving events, public pressures, and political and policy outcomes that have shaped emergency management in the United States.

You may wish to introduce this session by explaining that emergency management in the Nineteenth Century consisted generally of ad hoc event-specific disaster relief.

1800-1900

- As a formal responsibility of government in the United States, what we now call emergency management began with efforts to address **growing threats of fire and disease in large cities and towns** in the Nineteenth Century.
 - **Wooden construction** and increasingly **crowded urban areas** raised the risks of catastrophic disaster.
 - At the same time, **government services were minimal** and only a few social services were available through churches and other non-governmental institutions.
 - There was thus **little capacity for disaster response**.
- **1803: Passage of Congressional Fire Disaster Relief Legislation:**

“In 1803, **American responses to disaster took a significant turn**, beginning a pattern of federal involvement that continues to this day. When an **extensive fire** swept through **Portsmouth, New Hampshire**, community and state resources were taxed severely by the recovery effort. This situation was **dramatized to Congress**, which responded with the **first legislative action making federal resources available to assist a State and a local government**. **This congressional act of 1803 is commonly regarded as the first piece of national disaster legislation.**” (Drabek 1991, 6)
- **Major fires during the 1800s** continued **killing hundreds** in vulnerable major cities such as **New York, Chicago, and San Francisco**, which was devastated by the fires that swept much of the city in the wake of the **Great Earthquake of 1906**.
 - **Foreign immigrants**, as well as **emigrants from rural areas**, **crowded America's cities** and created even greater potential risk of disaster.
 - **Large facilities**, such as **theaters, hospitals, hotels, factories, and department stores**, were vulnerable to fire and structural failure and, often, city fire services were inadequate.

- **The national response to disasters that took place during the 19th century – such as fires, floods, and hurricanes – was to pass disaster relief legislation for specific events.**

“Between 1803 and 1950, more than one hundred disasters of various types across the nation were combated with federal resources made available under ad hoc legislative decrees.” (Drabek 1991, 6)

- **However:**

“During the twentieth century, the federal involvement initially took the form of little more than the congressional chartering of the Red Cross in 1905, federal troops to help maintain order in the wake of the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, and the granting of authority to the Army Corps of Engineers over flood control in the Mississippi Valley after the horrific 1927 flood.”¹

- **1916:** In August, Congress establishes the **Council of National Defense**.
 - The goal was to coordinate “Industries and resources for the national security and welfare” and to create “relations which will render possible in time of need the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the Nation.” The Council consisted of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor.
 - The establishment of the Council **led to the creation and coordination of civil defense units**. (DCPA 1972, 3)

“A total of **182,000 State and local defense councils**...directed ‘home-front’ activities deemed important to the war effort but which had virtually no relation to civilian protection...[e.g.] **morale, conservation, economic stability, and Americanization.**” (Yoshpe 1981, 57-58)
 - Civil defense was defined at the time as “...**a system that protects civilian population and private and public property against attack by an enemy.**” (FEMA 1990, II-12)
 - During the pre-war years, civil defense [as we understand it] did not exist, though the legislation passed during World War I provided a foundation for the program adopted after 1950. (DCPA 1972, 3)

¹ Aaron Schroeder and Gary Wamsley with Robert Ward. “The Evolution of Emergency Management in America: From a Painful Past to a Promising but Uncertain Future.” *Handbook of Crisis and Emergency Management*, Ali Farazmand, Ed. Marcel Decker, Inc. New York, Basel, 2001. p. 361

- **1928: The Lower Mississippi Flood Control Act of 1928** is passed.
- Passage of the Act is prompted by the great lower **Mississippi River Flood of 1927**. The Act authorizes:
 - A **series of dams and flood storage projects**,
 - **Channel improvements, floodways, and other measures** for the valley.
- These events mark the **scrapping of the “levees only” policy** of previous years and **expansion of the range of engineering** approaches to controlling the river. (Platt 1998, 38)
- **1933:** President Franklin Roosevelt grants the **Reconstruction Finance Corporation** “authority to **provide loans for the repair and reconstruction of certain public facilities that had been damaged by earthquakes....**” (Drabek 1991, 6)

[Drabek notes that other disasters were later included within this authority.]

- **1934:** The **Bureau of Public Roads is given authority to provide grants for repair of federal-aid highways and bridges damaged by natural disasters.** (FEMA 1999, 1)
- **1936: The National Flood Program** is set up under the **Flood Control Act of 1936**.

“The Flood Control Act of 1936 provided for a wide variety of projects, many of which were completed under the authority granted to **the Army Corps of Engineers**. Reflecting the **proactive approach advocated by engineers, hundreds of dams, dikes, and levees were erected to reduce vulnerability to floods.**” (Drabek 1991, 7)
- **1939 (September 8):** President Roosevelt issues **Executive Order 8248**. This order:
 - Established the **divisions of the Executive Office of the President** and
 - Defined their **functions and duties**.

This order provided for divisions that included, among others, “. . . in the event of a national emergency, or threat of a national emergency, **such office for emergency management as the President shall determine.**”²

² Executive Order 8248. September 8, 1939

- President Roosevelt follows with **Administrative Order of May 25, 1940³**, which:
 - **Established the Office for Emergency Management** in the Executive Office of the President.
 - Prescribed **regulations governing its activities**:
 - Assisting the President in the **clearance of information** about measures needed to respond to the emergency.
 - **Maintaining liaison** with the Council of National Defense, its Advisory Commission, and other agencies, to meet the threatened emergency.
- Then, the President issues **Administrative Order of January 7, 1941**, which **further defined the duties and functions** of the Office for Emergency Management, including:

“To advise and assist the President in the discharge of extraordinary responsibilities imposed upon him **by any emergency arising out of war, the threat of war, imminence of war, flood, drought, or other condition threatening the public peace or safety**”⁴

War Years

- During **World War II**, **civil defense programs** are established in the **Executive Office of the President** to make the nation less vulnerable to attack.⁵ Among its activities (DCPA 1972, 3,5) were:
 - Air raid watch, warning and alert systems.
 - Rescue units.
 - Shelter management.
 - Public Information.
 - Volunteer Training—upwards of 10 million. (Drabek 1991, 13; Yoshpe 1981, 69⁶).

³ Administrative Order of May 25, 1940

⁴ Administrative Order, January 7, 1941

⁵ The Office of Civil Defense was established within the Office of Emergency Management by Executive Order 8757, May 20, 1941, to assure, in part, for necessary cooperation with State and local governments with respect to measures for adequate protection of civilian population in war emergencies. (Yoshpe 1981, 515; citing *Significant Events in United States Civil Defense History* by Mary U. Harris, Information Services, DCPA, February 1975.

⁶ Yoshpe cites Nehemiah Jordan. 1966. *U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950: The Roots of Public Law 920*. Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analysis.

- Office of Civil Defense Administrator, Mayor Fiorello La Guardia (New York City) **“established nine Regional Civilian Defense Areas... coterminous... with the Army Corps...”** (Yoshpe 1981, 63)

Thus, the **origination of the Regional System that FEMA uses today.**

- **1941:** In September, La Guardia hires **Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt** as Assistant Director in Charge of Voluntary Participation.

“Terms such as ‘boondoggling,’ ‘fan dancers,’ ‘strip-tease artists,’ ‘piccolo players,’ ‘parasites,’ and ‘leaches’ were liberally used to describe Mrs. Roosevelt’s personnel and programs...some members of Congress hinted that ...the OCD [was turning] into a ‘pink tea party.’”⁷ (Kerr 1969, 33-34)

- **1941:** La Guardia announces the establishment of the **Civil Air Patrol**. (DCPA 1972, 3) on December 8th, the day after Pearl Harbor. (Yoshpe 1981, 516)
- **1945:** Effective June 30th, the **Office of Civil Defense is abolished.**⁸ (Yoshpe 1981, 72)
 - One commentator’s summary of the WWII legacy of civil defense:

“The civil defense worker was depicted as an air raid warden equipped with an arm band, tin helmet, bucket of sand, and a flashlight whose foremost duty was to get people to pull down their window shades during an air raid drill.” (Quoted in Yoshpe 1981, 72)

⁷ The February 21st, 1942 Congressional Appropriations Act providing \$100 million to the OCD included the stipulation that no part of the funding be used for “the employment of persons, the rent of facilities or the purchase of equipment and supplies to promote, produce or carry on instruction or direct instruction in physical fitness by dancers, fan dancing, street shows, theatrical performances or other public entertainment.” (Quoted by Harris 1975; included in Yoshpe 1981, 517)

⁸ Executive Order 9562, dated May 4, terminating the OCD on June 30th, 1945.

- Further:

“When the field of disaster research began in the early 1950s, the local civil defense director was likely to be a retired military man operating part-time out of a small office that was both physically removed from and programmatically marginal to centers of community decision making. The civil defense office, which at that time spent more time on war-related crisis planning than on disasters, typically lacked both resources and ties to other governmental units. The civil defense office was a place where people generally went to finish out their careers. Disasters were given a low priority by civil defense and other public safety agencies, except on those occasions when disasters actually did strike.”⁹

Post War Years

- **Prior to 1949 there had been several studies¹⁰, as well as calls by some State and local governments, for a federally-led civil defense effort. (DCPA 1972, 3-4)**

President Truman declined to develop and forward a national civil defense law and program because in his opinion population protection measures were basically a **State and local responsibility**. (Blanchard 1986, 2)

He was **supported in this by the Department of Defense**, which did not believe that the threat warranted such action and which was concerned that civil defense would become their responsibility and thus eat into their budget, perceived already as being too meager. (Blanchard 1986, 2)

⁹ Kathleen J. Tierney, Michael K. Lindell, Ronald W. Perry. 2001. *Facing the Unexpected—Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States*. “Societal Factors Influencing Emergency Management Policy and Practice Washington DC: Joseph Henry Press. p. 240

¹⁰ See, for example, United States Strategic Bombing Survey. 1946. *The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (June 30); U.S. War Department, Civil Defense Board. 1948. *A Study of Civil Defense* (commonly known at the time as the Bull Board Report). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, (February); and Office of Civil Defense Planning. 1948. *Civil Defense for National Security* (A Report to the Secretary of Defense, commonly referred to as the Hopley Report). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (October 1).

- **In August 1949, however. . .**

. . . the **Soviet Union explodes its first atomic device**, years earlier than had been thought possible. (Yoshpe 1981, 114)

Congress holds hearings on establishing a **Federal Civil Defense Program**. (Yoshpe 1981, 116)

- **Then, in June, 1950 North Korea invades the South.**
- **Followed in November by intervention of the People’s Republic of China.**
 - U.N. **forces are pushed back** all along the front.
 - In Washington, **concern grows that Korea was a diversion** to tie U.S. forces down as a **prelude to an attack in Europe—or even the U.S.**

It was in this crisis atmosphere¹¹ that **President Truman created the Federal Civil Defense Administration** within the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President (in December of 1949)¹². (Blanchard 1986, 2)

Then in September 1950, he forwarded to Congress civil defense legislation, which passed, and Truman signed into law in January 12, 1951—the **Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950**. (DCPA 1972, 5)

- **The Federal Civil Defense Act (FCDA) of 1950** (Public Law 920):
 - Stipulated that **civil defense was still primarily a State/local responsibility**.¹³
 - The **Federal Government would be given the authority to participate** by being given the authority to:
 - Prepare **plans and programs** (including sheltering and evacuation).
 - Provide **guidance**.
 - Provide **assistance**.

¹¹ President Truman “on December 16, proclaimed the existence of a national emergency...” (Yoshpe 1981, 146)

¹² Pursuant to Executive Order 10186, December 1, 1950. (Yoshpe 1981, 161)

¹³ It is the policy and intent of Congress that the responsibility for civil defense “shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions.” (Quoted in Yoshpe 1981, 149)

- Provide **training for State/local government personnel.** (FEMA 1990, II-12)
- Provide **matching 50/50 grants for procurement of supplies and equipment.** (Blanchard 1986, 2)
- Develop suitable **communications and warning systems or capabilities.** (Yoshpe 1981, 156, 158)
- **1950:** On September 30, the **Disaster Relief Act of 1950** (PL 81-875) is passed, **replacing ad hoc event-specific aid packages with general disaster relief law.** (Yoshpe 1981, 523; Birkland 1997, 49.)

With the passage of this act:

- A **national and permanent disaster relief program was established.**
- Basic philosophy: **Supplement State/local resources.**
 - **Funds are provided only to State and local governments – not individuals.**
 - **Principle of cost-sharing is introduced.** (FEMA 1998, 8-4)
 - **Authority to declare disaster is given to the President, not Congress.**
- **For most of the 1950s, however, the Federal government's thrust was toward State and local civil preparedness for wartime emergencies**—as noted above, defined in law as “primarily” a State and local responsibility.
 - First was an attempt to fund and build a **nationwide blast shelter program:**
 - (1) **Locate and mark existing basement shelter areas.**
 - (2) **Upgrade potential shelter areas.**
 - (3) **Construct shelters in deficit areas in “critical target cities.”** (Blanchard 1986, 2)

- But, the blast shelter program was **not funded**—for several reasons:
 - (1) **The crisis atmosphere in Washington had waned** as the Korean War stabilized and the feared Soviet attack in Europe failed to materialize.
 - (2) **Key Congressmen disagreed** with a Federal blast shelter program. (Blanchard 1986, 2-3)
 - (3) The idea was **viewed as expensive** and a **State and local responsibility**.
- **1951:** The FCDA announces the original cartoon character, **“Bert the Turtle,”** as the “star” of **“Duck and Cover,”** an FCDA **cartoon film** produced in cooperation with the National Education Association and FCDA.¹⁴

“A turtle was chosen as the star of a children’s civil defense campaign because his ability to duck and cover into his shell illustrates the basic principle of self-protection.” (Harris 1975; in Yoshpe 1981, 529)
- **1951:** FCDA announces **1.5 million people had volunteered** for civil defense duty.¹⁵
- **1952:** **“Alert America” convoy exhibit** on civil defense self-protection measures starts a tour of the country. (Harris 1975; in Yoshpe 1981, 530)
- **1952:** President Truman issues **Executive Order 10346**, the **first Executive Order to provide for the continuity of government** “during the existence of a civil-defense emergency.”¹⁶

The **National Security Resources Board (NSRB)** is **tasked** to establish standards and policies for uniformity of planning. **Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953** will, however, **abolish the NSRB**.¹⁷
- **1953:** President Truman confers upon the **FCDA** the **authority to direct and coordinate Federal assistance in major natural disasters**.¹⁸

¹⁴ Three million copies of a 16-page illustrated “Duck and Cover” booklet were produced – first released on December 2, 1951. (Harris 1975; in Yoshpe 1981, 529)

¹⁵ Announced on December 9th in year-end FCDA report. (Harris 1975; in Yoshpe 1981, 529)

¹⁶ Executive Order 10346, April 17, 1952.

¹⁷ Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953. June 12, 1953.

¹⁸ Executive Order 10427, January 16, 1953. (Yoshpe 1981, 166) Rescinded was Executive Order 10221, which had assigned this responsibility to Housing and Home Finance Administration. (Harris 1975; in Yoshpe 1981, 531)

- **1953: Evacuation Policy** comes to the fore under the Eisenhower Administration.

This policy follows the **explosion in 1953 of a Soviet hydrogen nuclear weapon** and **partial release of information** soon thereafter on the **effects of a 1952 U.S. hydrogen bomb explosion**. (Blanchard 1986, 4)

- The FCDA Administrator concluded that. . .

. . . the **blast and thermal effects of such weapons were so great cities would be doomed** in a nuclear attack. (Blanchard 1986, 4-5)

- This conclusion came **after** the initiation of “**Operation Doorstep**” on March 17, 1953, wherein **footage of an atomic bomb detonation was shown on television** and on **newsreel films** to “show explosive power of such a bomb and **tests of shelter precautions which could increase chances for survival.**” (Harris 1975; in Yoshpe 1981; 531)

- **1954: Evacuation policy comes into question** following the 1954 **explosion** by the **U.S. of the hydrogen bomb named BRAVO**—when the **lethal hazard of long-range radioactive fallout is discovered**. (Blanchard 1986, 5)

Until then fallout, while known about, had seemed to be a concern only in the immediate vicinity of a nuclear explosion—and even then, not a major concern relative to a weapon’s blast and thermal effects. (Ibid., 5)

However, with new knowledge that **lethal fallout could cover thousands of square miles, sheltering regained significance**. (Ibid., 5)

- **1958: Federal Civil Defense Act is amended.**¹⁹

- It makes civil defense a “**joint responsibility**” of the Federal government on the one hand and State and local governments on the other.²⁰
- Authorized, though not funded for several years²¹, was a **50/50 matching fund** program for “**Personnel and Administrative Expenses**” of State and local government civil defense personnel.

¹⁹ Public Law 85-606, August 8, 1958. (Yoshpe 1981, 216)

²⁰ The Administration bill that was passed was in reaction to HR. 2125, submitted by Congressman Chet Holifield, which called, among other things, for the establishment of civil defense as a primarily Federal, rather than primarily State, local and citizen responsibility. (Blanchard 1986, 6)

²¹ January 1961.

When funded a few years later, this led to the **creation of a civil defense cadre for the first time at the State and local government level.**

Consequently, many hundreds of **civil defense offices sprang up in counties, towns, cities, and States throughout the country.**

- **1958:** On April 24, President Eisenhower sends to Congress his **Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958** which, among other things:
 - Consolidated the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office of Defense Mobilization into the **Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization** within the Executive Office of the President. (DCPA 1972, 6)

The OCDM was a Presidential staff agency and its head was given a **seat on the National Security Council.** (Yoshpe 1981, 252)

Early 1960s—Fallout Shelter Era

- **President Kennedy** came into office and, early in his administration, **proposes a federally funded nationwide fallout shelter program.**
 - **The Gaither Committee, appointed by President Eisenhower, had recommended such a program.**²²
 - **The Soviet Union** had launched the **world's first successful Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs),**²³
 - And, it had launched the **world's first earth-orbiting satellite—Sputnik I.**²⁴ (Blanchard 1986, 7)
- Federal Civil Defense is reorganized—from an independent organization within the Executive Office of the President to the **Office of Civil Defense [OCD]** within the **Department of Defense** (reporting to the Secretary of Defense)²⁵. (DCPA 1972, 6)

²² Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee. 1957. *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age* (popularly known as the Gaither Report after its chairman). Washington, DC: (November 7). This classified report was declassified in 1973 and subsequently reprinted in 1976 by the U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Defense Production (94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976).

²³ August 26, 1957.

²⁴ October 4, 1957.

²⁵ Executive Order 10952, July 20, 1961.

- **May 1961: Following one of the Berlin Crises of the time, President Kennedy delivers a “Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs,” which outlines his policies on a number of issues, including civil defense:**

“One major element of the national security program which this Nation has never squarely faced up to is civil defense....[W]e have never adopted a consistent policy. Public considerations have been largely characterized by apathy, indifference, and skepticism....

“This Administration has been looking very hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply. It...cannot deter a nuclear attack...this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men. And the history of this planet is sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an irrational attack, a miscalculation, or an accidental war which cannot be either foreseen or deterred. The nature of modern warfare heightens these possibilities. It is on this basis that civil defense can readily be justified – as insurance for the civilian population in the event of such a miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed – but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.” (Quoted in Blanchard 1986, 8; see, also, 9)

- **July 25, 1961: President Kennedy addresses the nation:**
 - Describes **threat of war brought on by the Berlin Crisis.**
 - Notes that he is **calling up certain reserve units to cope with the threat.**
 - **Stresses need for civil defense—was ordering speed-up of citizen self-help information.**
 - The President **will ask Congress for \$207 million for a group fallout shelter program that could save 10-15 million lives in a nuclear attack.** (Harris 1975; in Yoshpe 1981, 541)
- To implement his new civil defense policy, President Kennedy sends to Congress a special request for an **emergency supplement appropriation**—\$207 million—about twice that of any civil defense request of the previous Eisenhower Administration. Congress passed the act. (DCPA 1972, 7)
- These “no-year” funds (could be spent in any year as opposed to expiring at the end of the fiscal year appropriated), with a **buying power of over \$1 billion in 1986 dollars, were used during the next decade to try to develop a nationwide system of:**

- **Fallout shelter identification.**
- **Marking.**
- **Stocking (food, water and medical supplies).**

- **October, 1962—Cuban Missile Crisis:**

The full-blown crisis brings the U.S. and the Soviet Union to the brink of war when Intermediate-Range ballistic missiles are discovered in Cuba—with more on ships on the way.

- **All over the country people started asking their civil defense director, if they had one, what could they do? Where could they go? Why wasn't more being done?**
- **Many build home fallout shelters – sometimes referred to now as the “fallout shelter craze.”** (Blanchard 1986, 10)
- **OCD accelerates fallout shelter survey, marking and stocking program.** (Harris 1975; in Yoshpe 1981, 543)

But, the **Crisis ended, war was averted, President Kennedy was assassinated**²⁶, many in and out of government resolved that **nuclear war must not happen**, and **Vietnam** came onto the national radar screen.

The nationwide **fallout shelter system was not completed**, and supplies that had been purchased and placed within shelters were turned over to State and local governments—eventually to be disposed of.²⁷

- In **April of 1964**, under President Johnson, **Civil Defense is reassigned to a lower level within the Department of Defense—placed under the Secretary of the Army.** (DCPA 1972, 7)
- **1964 marks a major turning point for nuclear attack oriented civil defense.**

The focus turns **from fallout shelters to crisis-implemented programs—such as evacuation—later to be called Crisis Relocation Planning.** (Blanchard 1986, 14-15)

²⁶ November 22, 1963 in Dallas, Texas.

²⁷ At the time of Kennedy's death 110 million fallout shelter spaces had been identified and shelter supplies for 14 million spaces stocked. (Blanchard 1986, 11)

- **1964:** President Johnson signs the **National Plan for Emergency Preparedness drafted by the Office of Emergency Preparedness (a FEMA predecessor agency)**. The Plan addressed **continuity of Federal Government operations**.

Mid-1960s and 1970s

- Policies were adopted to **make wartime-related civil defense resources available for peacetime hazard dual-use** applications.

This was due to **growing concerns about the potential for other kinds of catastrophic natural and technological disasters** and lessening concerns about nuclear attack.

(Blanchard 1986, 16-17)

- E. L. Quarantelli presents this generalization about the dynamics of the relationship between civil defense and civil protection activities:

“In some instances, a civil defense emphasis at the *national* level has led to the emergence or development of *local* civil protection systems.”²⁸

Quarantelli presents the following **trends in community disaster planning in the 1960s:**

- (1) **The scope of disaster planning was broadened to include a wider range of disaster agents.**
 - (2) **There was a decline in the assumption that preparation for a nuclear attack was sufficient planning for all types of disaster contingencies.**
 - (3) **There was a shift in the focus of disaster planning from the emphasis on security of the nation to the concern with the viability of the local community.** (Dynes and Quarantelli 1977, 17)²⁹
- **1965: OCD Eastern and Western Instructor Training Centers Closed.** (Harris 1975; in Yoshpe 1981, 541)

²⁸ E.L. Quarantelli. 2000. *Disaster Planning, Emergency Management and Civil Protection: The Historical Development of Organized Efforts to Plan for and to Respond to Disasters* (Preliminary Paper #301). Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware. Newark, DE. p. 10

²⁹ Ibid.

- **1965:** (September 6-10) **Hurricane Betsy** causes **\$6.5 billion** (1990 dollars) in damage in south Florida and Louisiana **and 75 deaths.**

It measured 600 miles from one end to the other by the time it hit S. Florida—and caused flooding in Miami and Fort Lauderdale from a 6-foot storm surge.³⁰

- **1965—Congress calls for a study of floods:**

“In 1965, Congress called for a study of flood insurance and other measures as alternatives to structural flood control and disaster assistance.” (Platt 1998, 40).

“The geographic focus of flood policy attention shifted to the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts in the wake of a series of vicious hurricanes during the 1950s and 1960s.” (Platt 1998, 40)

“Two ensuing reports, respectively authored by resource economist Marion Clawson and geographer Gilbert F. White, recommended that a national flood insurance program might be feasible if it contained requirements for land use controls and building standards to reduce future losses.” (Platt 1998, 40)

“Congress responded by passing the National Flood Insurance Act.” (Platt 1998, 40)

“This act established the **National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)**, which has become the primary vehicle of federal flood policy.” (Platt 1998, 40)

- **1968-69: National Oil & Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan** is drafted.
 - Precipitated by 1967 **Torrey Canyon Tanker Spill** (Rubin and Tanali 1999)—a 100,000-ton oil spill off the coast of Cornwall England.³¹

³⁰ *Bad Betsy Bashes Bahamas, Florida and Gulf Coast.* 1999.

<http://hamptonroads.digitalcity.com/hurricane/betsy.htm>

³¹ A 100,000 plus ton oil spill off the coast of Cornwall England. (*The Hutchinson Encyclopedia.* 1999. Helicon Publishers. <http://ukdb.web.aol.com/hutchinson/encyclopedia/11/A0000411.htm>)

- **1969, August 17-18: Hurricane Camille:**
 - A **Category 5** hurricane, the **second strongest ever to hit the United States**.
 - Hit the **Mississippi Gulf Coast** on Sunday night, August 17 and continued into **Louisiana and Alabama** during the early morning hours of the 18th.³²
 - Brought **winds in excess of 200 mph and tides of 20 feet**. (FEMA 1998, 2-10)
 - Caused **256-258 deaths**. (FEMA 1998, 2-10) and left **68 persons missing**. (DeAngelis/Nelson, 5)
 - **World’s longest bridge, the Pontchartrain Causeway, was submerged**.³³
 - Moved up inland East Coast causing **record rainfalls**—more than **25 inches** in some locations.³⁴
 - Caused an **estimated \$1.42 billion in total damages**. (DeAngelis and Nelson, 5)

- **Silverstein writes that:**

“At the time of Hurricane Camille, the federal government viewed its responsibility in natural disasters as limited to issuing regional alerts to populations that were in projected paths of storms and, after disaster struck, assisting in emergency recovery efforts for people exposed to health hazards and other threats to personal safety. Hurricane Camille marked the beginning of an era when the U.S. federal government recognized that its responsibility ran deeper than the traditional emergency food kitchens and temporary shelters it had previously provided.” (Silverstein 1992, ix)

- This understanding leads to the development and passage of the **Disaster Relief Act of 1969**.³⁵

³² FEMA/EMI 1998, 2-10

³³ FEMA/EMI 1998, 2-10

³⁴ DeAngelis and Nelson, 3

³⁵ Introduced role of Federal Coordinating Officer to represent the President in coordinating disaster relief. (FEMA 1998, 8-4)

- Also: **The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973** (and Program) are enacted, **canceling the 1965 Act**.

This action was influenced by **Hurricanes Camille in 1969 and Agnes in 1972**.³⁶

- **1972:** On May 5th, the **Nixon Administration reorganizes Office of Civil Defense** into the **Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA)** within the Department of Defense. (DCPA 1972, 8)
 - **Dual-Use** and **Crisis Relocation Planning** will be the major philosophies.³⁷

Based on “...the premise that a community prepared to deal with peacetime hazards is that much better prepared to cope with the effects of a nuclear attack” (DCPA 1972, 8).

- The term **“Dual-Use”** is **officially used for the first time**. (FEMA 1990, II-13)

“The new agency will provide preparedness assistance planning in all areas of civil defense and natural disasters. The goals of the DCPA are to provide an effective National Civil Defense Program and planning guidance to State and local governments in their achievement of total disaster preparedness”³⁸. (DCPA 1972, 8)

- **1973:** The Nixon Administration **dismantles the Office of Emergency Preparedness**.³⁹

“The General Services Administration (GSA) fell heir to OEP’s civil defense, continuity of government, resource management, and other emergency preparedness functions;⁴⁰ and OEP’s disaster preparedness and relief functions devolved on the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).” (Yoshpe 1981, 438)

³⁶ Rubin and Tanali. 1999.

³⁷ Presidential guidance was provided on August 14, 1972, directing that increased emphasis be given to dual-use planning, procedures and preparedness, including improvements in crisis management planning. (Harris 1975; in Yoshpe 1981, 547)

³⁸ Defense Department Directive No. 5105.43 is released on July 14, 1972, detailing DCPA responsibilities for both civil defense and natural disaster preparedness. (Harris 1975; in Yoshpe 1981, 547)

³⁹ Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 (January 26), for the purpose of reducing the size of the Executive Office of the President. (Yoshpe 1981, 438 and 547)

⁴⁰ An Office of Preparedness (later renamed the Federal Preparedness Agency) was created in GSA on July 1st to house these functions. (Yoshpe 1981, 441).

- A former FEMA historian offers this commentary:

“With a particularly astonishing piece of reasoning, the president maintained that his office of emergency preparedness had done its work so effectively that it was no longer needed—at least in the White House and on the National Security Council. Although it would later be claimed that the president merely wanted to reduce his executive staff so as to appear to be honoring the national shiboleths [sic] of *Economy* and *Efficiency*, he appears to have had in mind the eventual establishment of a cabinet-level department of community development. In any case, reorganization effectively submerged the vestiges of national preparedness.”⁴¹

The **Federal Disaster Assistance Administration** was established in HUD in July. (Harris 1975; in Yoshpe 1981, 548)

- **1974:** The **Disaster Relief Act of 1974** is passed following the destruction left in the wake of Hurricane Agnes, impacting six States. (Rubin and Tanali 1999)
 - **Authority to provide individual and family assistance** was granted pursuant to the new Act. (FEMA 1998, 8-4)
 - **Agnes struck the U.S. on June 19, 1972** when it moved inland near **Panama City, Florida and soon spawned 15 tornadoes in Florida and 2 more in Georgia.**
 - Downgraded to a Tropical Storm, **Agnes moved northward over the coastal and Appalachian regions, producing very heavy rainfalls in Virginia, New York, Pennsylvania, and the New England States.**
 - On June 22, Agnes joined forces with a large system moving southward from Canada. In the words of Burton, Kates, and White:

⁴¹ John J. Rumbarger, FEMA, 1982-86. Unpublished article, “Prologue: Crisis in Emergency Preparedness.” 1983. P. 2. Rumbarger cites Part I, “Emergency Preparedness and Industrial Mobilization,” Report by the Joint Committee on Defense Production, Congress of the United States, pp. 169-172, *Civil Preparedness Review Part I*, 1977 and “Excerpts from the President’s Message to Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan. No. 1 of 1973,” *After Disaster Strikes*, 1974. pp. 111.112.

“The result was a tremendous conjunction of rain-producing mechanisms moving westward across New York State and Pennsylvania. In some places 19 inches fell over a 2-day period...A third of the stream-gauging stations in the Susquehanna Basin were washed out, as were the lines used to report their readings...downtown Harrisburg [PA] was under 3 feet of water...and at many places in the region the streams were running higher than ever before recorded. At Richmond, Virginia, the James River was 2 meters above the record set in 1771....Property damage was estimated to exceed \$3.5 billion. At least 118 people had lost their lives. In monetary terms it was the greatest material disaster in the history of the United States....More than 250,000 people in Pennsylvania alone were obliged to leave their homes.”

- **1975:** The **National Shelter Survey** program “through mid-1975 had brought the inventory up to 230 million public fallout shelter spaces.” (Yoshpe 1981, 427)

- **1976: Congress passes legislation** (Public Law 94-361; July 13) **sanctioning “Dual Use.”**

This legislation “established as a matter of national policy that resources acquired and maintained under the Federal Civil Defense Act should be utilized to minimize the effects of natural disasters when they occurred.” (Yoshpe 1981, 32)

- **1977:** The **National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act (NEHRA)** is passed, creating the **National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP)**, and mandating a **Federal Response Plan for Catastrophic Earthquakes**.
 - This was prompted in part by 1971 **San Fernando, CA** earthquake. (Rubin & Tanali 1999)

Though a **moderate-range 6.6 Richter Scale quake, it created much damage** “because it occurred only 13 km below the surface and was on the margin of a highly urbanized area....” (Smith 1996, 126)

Direct damage to buildings and other structures exceeded **\$500 million (\$1.8 billion in 1997 dollars)**. (Aurelius 1994, 3)

The quake **caused partial collapse of lower Van Norman Dam north of Los Angeles** and **80,000 people** had to be **evacuated**.

Damage to hospitals, most notably a **Veterans Administration Hospital**, highlighted the vulnerability of such facilities to earthquakes. (Gates 1972)

- Before this time, as one commentator notes, “**no coherent federal policy existed to encourage research on and implementation of ways to reduce earthquake losses.**” (Birkland 1997, 49.)

“Before the NFIP and the NEHRA, the primary goal of federal disaster policy, across all types of disasters, was post-disaster relief. Except for federal flood control programs, which combined elements of disaster mitigation with a healthy degree of distributive federal spending on local construction projects, the federal government had largely left disaster mitigation duties to state and local officials, through a decentralized process centered on state and local building codes. A series of disasters in the 1960s and early 1970s caused members of the disaster policy community, and the earthquake community in particular, to consider how federal policy might be reoriented toward mitigating disasters rather than simply responding to them after the fact. Central to this shift was the understanding that while we cannot predict many disasters nor prevent them from happening, we can alter our behaviors before events occur to make them less damaging.” (Birkland 1997, 138)

- **1977: National Oil & Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan** revised.

Followed 1976 **Argo Merchant oil spill**. (Rubin and Tanali 1999) on December 21st off of **Nantucket Island, MA**,⁴² spilling entire cargo of 7.7 **million gallons** of No. 6 fuel oil.⁴³

- Quarantelli writes that:

“... in the decade of the 1970s, the research showed that: Local civil defense offices vary considerably in the scope of the hazards with which they are concerned. Some are completely focused on planning and the associated task dealing with nuclear attack. Others are primarily concerned with natural disaster hazards. Many are concerned with both but the degree of emphasis on one or the other will vary. A smaller number show a range of concern with a wide range of hazards—man-made, nuclear, natural disaster, etc.” (Dynes and Quarantelli 1977, 39)

⁴²Office of Response and Restoration, National Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 30 April 1998. <http://www.wrc.noaa.gov/sites/hazmat/photos/ships/02.html>;

⁴³ Office of Response and Restoration, National Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 30 April 1998. <http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/photos/ships/03.html>

- **1978: National Governor’s Association (NGA) Report on Emergency Preparedness⁴⁴:**

“The stimulus for the [DCPA funded] project was an NGA policy statement describing the **governors’ increasing concern about ‘the lack of a comprehensive national emergency policy, as well as the dispersion of federal responsibilities among numerous federal agencies, which has hampered states’ ability to manage disaster situations’**” (Drabek 1991, 17).

- Among the more important positions advocated by the **NGA Report**:
 - **Consolidation of disperse Federal programs (led to the creation of FEMA.)**
 - **Greater State and local discretion in the use of Federal funds.**
 - **Adoption of a Comprehensive Emergency Management philosophy.**
 - **Greater attention paid to mitigation and recovery.** (Drabek 1991, 17-18)
- The report called for “federal, state, and local governments to enter into an equal partnership and to adopt a comprehensive approach to emergency management.”⁴⁵
- **1978: President Carter initiates a reorganization of Federal programs (Reorganization Plan #3 of 1978).**⁴⁶ This was in response to:
 - **Criticism of the Federal response to the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant incident.**
 - **Criticisms in the National Governor’s Association Report.**

⁴⁴ National Governors’ Association. 1978. *Emergency Preparedness Project: Final Report*. Washington, DC: NGA.

⁴⁵ Kathleen J. Tierney, Michael K. Lindell, Ronald W. Perry. 2001. *Facing the Unexpected—Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States*. “Societal Factors Influencing Emergency Management Policy and Practice” Washington DC: Joseph Henry Press. p. 235

⁴⁶ The Reorganization Plan became effective on September 16, 1978, but the complexity inherent in establishing FEMA took almost a year—selecting new management, working out details of transfers of functions, for example. (Yoshpe 1981, 490)

- **1979: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is created**⁴⁷ pursuant to Reorganization Plan #3 of 1978. (Drabek 1991, 17)

Previously scattered Federal activities to prepare for, respond to, mitigate and recover from all types – natural, technological, or attack-related – were consolidated within FEMA.

- Brought into the new agency were:
 - **Defense Civil Preparedness Agency**, Department of Defense.
 - **Federal Preparedness Agency**, General Services Administration.
 - **Federal Insurance Administration**, Housing and Urban Development.
 - **Federal Disaster Assistance Administration**, Housing and Urban Development.
 - **National Fire Prevention and Control Administration**, Department of Commerce.
 - **National Fire Academy**, Department of Commerce.
 - **Community Preparedness Program**, National Weather Service (Commerce).
 - **Dam Safety Coordination**, Executive Office of the President.
 - **Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program**, Executive Office of the President.
 - **Consequences Management of Terrorism**, Executive Office of the President.
 - **Warning and Emergency Broadcast Program**, Executive Office of the President. (Drabek 1991, 10)

⁴⁷ Executive Order 12127, issued March 31, 1979 activated FEMA, effective April 1, 1979, and provided for the transfer of FIA, USFA and EBS functions. Executive Order 12148, dated July 20, 1979 implemented the remaining transfer of functions to FEMA (DCPA, FPA and FDAA). (Yoshpe 1981, 490-491, citing *Presidential Documents, Federal Register*, Vol. 44, No. 143, July 24, 1979, pp. 43239-43245.)

- **Reorganization Plan #3 gave FEMA the primary responsibility for:**
 - (1) **Establishing Federal disaster policies.** (FEMA 1998, 8-5)
 - (2) **Mobilizing Federal resources for disaster response.**
 - (3) **Coordinating Federal efforts with those of State and local governments.** (FEMA 1998, 8-5)
 - (4) **Managing Federal disaster response activities.**⁴⁸
 - With the creation of the FEMA in **1979, congressional policies** fostered **hazard-specific planning** for a range of disasters, including peacetime and wartime nuclear disasters, earthquake, hurricanes, and floods.
 - John Macy, former Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, became FEMA's first Director. (FEMA 1999, 2)
- **1979: President Carter issues Presidential Decision (PD) 41—New Civil Defense Policy.**
 - PD 41 stipulated that Civil Defense (CD) should:
 - Enhance the survivability of the American people.
 - Enhance deterrence and stability.
 - Include planning for population relocation in time of international crisis.
 - Be adaptable to help deal with natural disasters and peacetime emergencies. (Yoshpe 1981, 492)
 - A 1979 paper submitted by the DCPA assesses points of view on civil defense as it relates to the strategic balance and outlines the Executive Branch studies on U.S. and Soviet civil defense that led to PD 41. The paper suggests the level of political fallout if there were not an effective program of civil defense:

⁴⁸ Sandra K. Schneider. 1995. *Flirting with Disaster –Public Management in Crisis Situations*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, p. 22.

“Should a severe crisis have found the U.S. unprepared, it is virtually certain that the Administration of the time would afterwards be called to account for its omissions and those of its predecessors. . . . In short, there will be no public outcry for civil defense in normal times. There will be modest political profit, if any, for an administration proposing enhanced civil defense, or a Congress approving it; the subject is not a congenial one. But should a frightening crisis find civil defense in disarray, the people (and the Congress) would surely demand to know what had been done. . . .”⁴⁹

- The DCPA majority viewpoint on “dual use” was that **preparedness for peacetime emergencies would be a “secondary but desirable objective.”** Many in DCPA believed that:

“FEMA would do well to stress attack preparedness while of course recognizing preparedness for peacetime disasters as a welcome bonus, and a significant and legitimate concern of States and localities. The latter can be relied on to add an ample tincture of emphasis on peacetime disaster readiness, so there is no compelling need for FEMA to stress peacetime preparedness at the expense (real or perceived) of attack readiness.”⁵⁰

It is important to note that Executive Order 12148, July 15, 1979, transferred DCPA to FEMA.

- **1980:** The President issues Executive Order 12241, **National Contingency Plan for Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants.**
 - This was precipitated by **Three Mile Island** nuclear power plant incident, Harrisburg, PA.
- **1980, December 11:** The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) is passed, commonly known as the **Superfund Law**⁵¹.
 - **Purpose:** Locate, investigate, clean up worst hazardous chemical waste sites.⁵²
 - **Provisions:**
 - Established prohibitions and requirements concerning closed and abandoned hazardous waste sites.

⁴⁹William Chapman. July 13, 1979. Civil Defense for the 1980's—Current Issues. DCPA. pp 57-58

⁵⁰ DCPA, 1979, p. 66.

⁵¹ *About Superfund.* <http://www.epa.gov/superfund/whatissf/index.htm>

⁵² *About Superfund.* <http://www.epa.gov/superfund/whatissf/index.htm>

- Provided for liability of persons responsible for releases of hazardous waste at these sites.
- Established a trust fund to provide for cleanup when no responsible party can be found.⁵³
- **Chemical and petroleum industries to be taxed to create and maintain the fund.**
- This was precipitated by **Love Canal (1978)**. (Rubin and Tanali, 1990)
- Love Canal is a neighborhood in Niagara Falls, NY:

“The nickname ‘Love Canal’ came from the last name of William Love who in 1896 began digging a canal connecting Lake Ontario and Lake Erie (bypassing Niagara Falls) in order to serve as a water power conduit. It was never completed but the Hooker Chemical Company...had the...idea of turning the uncompleted canal into a dumping ground for the chemical by-products of its manufacturing process. Once the canal was filled with waste, the land was covered over and sold to the Niagara Falls city school board for \$1.00 and a school and subdivision of homes was built right on top of the waste. The chemicals were detected leaking out of the site in 1977 and many health problems were...reported.⁵⁴ Residents were evacuated after a lengthy fight with the New York State government. Today, it remains a ghost town.”⁵⁵
- **1980: Congress amends the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (adding Title V) to:**
 - **Emphasize crisis relocation** to enhance the survival of both the population and the leaders of the U.S.
 - **Enhance deterrence and stability and reduce possibility of coercion by an enemy during a crisis.**
- Previous **dual-use policy is Congressionally sanctioned**—peacetime use of resources provided for defense against attack could be used **“to the extent that the use of funds is consistent with, contributes to, and does not detract from attack preparedness.”** (FEMA 1990, II-13)

⁵³ *About Superfund*. <http://www.epa.gov/superfund/whatissf/index.htm>

⁵⁴ E.g. birth defects, “miscarriages, still births, crib deaths, nervous breakdowns, hyperactivity, epilepsy, and urinary tract disorders” (*A History of Love Canal*. <http://www.essential.org/cchw/lovcanal/lcsum.html>)

⁵⁵ *Love Canal USA*, pp.4-5. <http://web.globalserve.net/~spinc/atomcc/lovecana.htm>

- Also in **1980**, the **National Governor's Association** endorses the **all-hazards emergency management approach**.
- **1981: FEMA begins to adopt an** all-hazards emergency management approach designed to provide **a single, flexible system capable of adjusting to many kinds of hazards**.
- **1982: President Reagan** issues a **National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-26)**, which:
 - Outlines goals for a proposed seven-year, **\$4.2 billion civil defense program**, and
 - States that those goals were **to be achieved by 1989**. (Blanchard 1986, 22)

This program was **never completely funded by Congress**.

It elicited strong opposition from **anti-nuclear war groups** who viewed it as part of a **war-fighting strategy**, attempting to “make nuclear war plans credible to the Soviets and acceptable to Americans.” (Ibid.)

It was viewed by many in **Congress** as **useless, unworkable, or provocative**.

- Options were put forth for developing effective approaches to achieving broad understanding of the civil defense program. One option—not to be promoted as part of a defense strategy—was:

“... building an approach from the stance that **nuclear war is unthinkable**; and that **no one would “win”** in an all-out attack; and that **chances for survival in a habitable world after an all-out attack would be extremely bleak**. It also includes **focusing efforts on non-nuclear wartime emergencies and nuclear and non-nuclear peacetime emergencies**. A **comprehensive approach emergency management** would be stressed. In employing this option, we would be “preparing just in case,” and we would be prepared for **the full range of possible emergency situations**.”⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Paula D. Gordon, PhD. March, 1982. *Approaches to Developing Understanding of the Civil Defense Program*. FEMA Issue Paper NF/OCP/CIV SYST 82-1. The George Washington University, Washington DC. p. 18

- Quarantelli comments on the relationship between disaster planning and civil defense:

“Early in the 1980s, the **emphasis turned sharply to a focus on disasters and away from civil defense**, as symbolically indicated by the fact that **many of the local offices changed their names from “Office of Civil Defense” to usually something with the terms “Emergency Management” or “Disaster Planning** in their titles. . . .”⁵⁷

- **1983: FEMA attempts a new approach to Congressional support in 1983 – positioning its programs within a new philosophy called IEMS—standing for the **Integrated Emergency Management System**.**

IEMS emphasized **that both attack and peacetime emergencies required similar responses**. For example, a plan to evacuate a city in response to an accident at a nuclear power plant, or a hurricane, would be useful also for evacuation in case of an international crisis. (Blanchard 1986, 23)

“FEMA instituted **IEMS** in 1983. Its objective was to develop and maintain a credible emergency management capability nationwide by integrating activities along functional lines at all levels of government and, to the fullest extent possible, across all hazards. Through a 13-step process, IEMS collected basic information from State and local emergency management organizations on which reasonable and justifiable plans could be made and implemented to increase emergency management capabilities nationwide” (FEMA 1997, *Multi Hazard...*, xxii).

- **The stated goal of IEMS was to develop and maintain credible emergency management capabilities nationwide for all types of emergencies, at all levels of government.**
 - As noted above, this all-hazards, or IEMS, approach emphasized that **common functions** need to be considered in planning for and responding to all catastrophic emergencies. These include:
 - Warning & Communications.
 - Evacuation.
 - Sheltering.

⁵⁷ E.L. Quarantelli. 1995. *Disaster Planning, Emergency Management, and Civil Protection: The Historical Development and Current Characteristics of Organized Efforts to Prevent and Respond to Disasters* (Preliminary Paper #227). Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, Newark DE. p. 10

- Direction and Control.
 - Continuity of Government (or Operations).
 - Resource Management.
 - Maintenance of Public Safety.
 - Maintenance of Essential Public Services (food, medical care, etc.).
- Even though the IEMS concept stresses the functions common to all hazards facing a jurisdiction or organization, it recognizes that there **are unique aspects of individual hazards** that warrant special consideration.
 - The process is aimed toward a continual **upgrading of emergency response capability and a reduction of duplicated efforts and resources** through joint, community planning.
 - It is **applicable to all jurisdictions** regardless of size or level of sophistication, even though not all are confronted by the same hazards, and not all have or require the same capability.

In one community the following separate plans and procedures existed: the county disaster plan; a separate emergency plan for each school prepared by the principal; an overall school emergency procedure planning guide; a storm response manual for both gas and electricity prepared by the utility; planning procedures for the fire department; a police department emergency plan; a citywide post-disaster cleanup plan; a countywide post-disaster plan; an emergency medical services response plan; and an emergency plan for each of the military facilities in the area. Few of these plans are referenced or coordinated with each other.” (Perry/Mushkatel 1986, 142-143; citing Greene and Gori 1982, 10)

- **1985: The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan** is promulgated.
 - It had been put into development after the **Three Mile Island nuclear emergency**. Events such as this have sometimes led to changes in the way disasters are managed.
 - The **Bhopal disaster** influenced legislation affecting preparedness for chemical emergencies.
 - The **Exxon oil spill** led to new Federal oil spill management⁵⁸.

- **1986, October 17: Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)** (re: CERCLA, 1980)⁵⁹ This Act:
 - Stressed the importance of permanent remedies to cleaning up hazardous waste sites.
 - Required Superfund actions to consider standards and requirements found in other State and Federal environmental laws and regulations.
 - Provided new enforcement authorities and settlement tools.
 - Increased State involvement in every phase of the Superfund program.
 - Increased the focus on human health problems posed by hazardous waste sites.
 - Encouraged greater citizen participation in making decisions on how sites should be cleaned up (leads to creation of Local Emergency Preparedness Committees).
 - Increased the size of the trust fund to \$8.5 billion.⁶⁰

- **1986: The National Contingency Plan for Oil Spills and Hazardous Materials Releases** (40 C.F.R., Part 300) **is promulgated.**

- **1987:** Denied the increased funding sought pursuant to the 1982 Presidential National Security Decision Directive, in 1987 **President Reagan issues a new Presidential Policy Guidance document** that reduced his civil defense goal to an ability to “surge” such capabilities in a future international crisis.

⁵⁸ Kathleen J. Tierney, Michael K. Lindell, Ronald W. Perry. 2001. *Facing the Unexpected—Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States*. “Conceptualizing Disasters and their Impacts.” Washington DC: Joseph Henry Press. p.3

⁵⁹ *CERCLA Overview*. <http://www.epa.gov/superfund/whatissf/cercla.htm>

⁶⁰ *SARA Overview*. <http://www.epa.gov/superfund/whatissf/sara.htm>

This new approach emphasized funding for elements that could not be quickly surged in a crisis – such as the construction of **emergency operations centers**.

Not significantly funded by Congress, this initiative essentially marks **the last attack-related civil defense program in the U.S.**

- **1987: The Federal Response Plan for Catastrophic Earthquakes** is published in the Federal Register **and** in
- **1988: FEMA Planning Assistance to Commercial Nuclear Power Plants**, Executive Order 12657, is issued.

Both of these were influenced by the Chernobyl disaster.

- **1988: The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act** (Public Law 93-288) is passed. The Stafford Act:
 - **Legislated cost sharing for the Public Assistance Program.**
 - **Redefined meaning of eligible private nonprofit facility.**
 - **Encouraged hazard mitigation via cost-sharing program:**
 - 75% Federal, 25% State
 - Emphasis was to reduce vulnerability to natural hazards.
 - **Confirmed the importance of individual assistance:**
 - Individual Family Grant Program authorized.
 - Disaster Housing Program authorized.
 - **Added authority for non-natural disasters and the term "emergency" was redefined.**

- **1989: FEMA comes under severe criticism for its response to Hurricane Hugo.**
 - SC Senator Fritz Hollings calls FEMA “the sorriest bunch of bureaucratic jackasses I’ve ever known.”

“FEMA, the agency in charge of the response process, received most of the blame; **FEMA, not Hurricane Hugo, was referred to as the real disaster.**”⁶¹
- **1990: FEMA comes under criticism for its response to the Loma Prieta earthquake.**
 - Norman Y. Mineta (D-CA) declared that FEMA “could screw up a two-car parade.”
- **1990: The Oil Pollution Act is enacted**, a response to the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.
- **1990: The Federal Response Plan for Natural Hazards** is published in draft.
- **1992: Federal Response Plan** completed in April, reflecting emergency mission agreements between **twenty-six Federal agencies and the American Red Cross.**
 - Twelve (thirteen, considering the crosscutting Public Information Function) **Emergency Support Functions** (ESFs) comprise the Federal Response Plan⁶²:
 - ESF 1: Transportation
 - ESF 2: Communication
 - ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering
 - ESF 4: Firefighting
 - ESF 5: Information and Planning
 - ESF 6: Mass Care

⁶¹ Sandra K. Schneider. 1998. Reinventing Public Administration: A Case Study of the Federal Emergency management Agency. *PAQ* Spring. p. 47. (Citing Michael L. Cook, 1989. “FEMA: Bureaucratic Disaster Area.” *The State*. November 1.)

⁶² *Global Blueprints for Change*, 1st Ed. “A Model for Emergency Response—the Federal Response Plan in the United States. Prepared in conjunction with the International Workshop on Disaster Reduction convened in Reston VA. August 18-22, 2001.

- ESF 7: Resource Support
- ESF 8: Health and Medical Services
- ESF 9: Urban Search and Rescue
- ESF 10: Hazardous Materials
- ESF 11: Food
- ESF 12: Energy
- ESF 13: Public Information
- **1992 (June): House Appropriations Committee issues a damning report concerning FEMA.**

“The report found that the agency’s morale not only was low but that there was **outright bureaucratic war within the agency between the political appointees and the career officials**. The committee’s report not only accused the upper administration of **mismanagement and incompetence**, but also publicly labeled the agency as a **‘dumping ground’ for political appointees.**”

Director Wallace Stickney, who was the former head of the New Hampshire Department of Transportation and a close personal friend of John Sununu, the White House chief of staff, “retorted that the report was full of ‘innuendo. . . downright gossip and hallway speculation,’ but he nonetheless faced **powerful congressional forces opposed to the continuation of the agency’s existence**. (Schroeder, et al., in Farazmand 2001, 378)

- **1992 (August 24): FEMA comes under criticism for its response to Hurricane Andrew.**

“Andrew had. . . shown that the **system at all levels was inadequate to deal with a disaster of [its] magnitude**. . . [T]he state system seemed immobilized and **FEMA, operating from its normal posture of ‘responder of last resort,’ was waiting for state officials to ask** for assistance and to say what they needed.” (Schroeder, et al., in Farazmand 2001, 378-379)

“Where the hell is the cavalry on this one? We need food. We need water. We need people. For God’s sake, where are they?” (Newsweek 1992:23). “The **politically explosive sound bite** [Kate Hale, Dade County’s director of emergency preparedness in a nationally televised news conference 3 days after Andrew struck] was a perfect example of the **camcorder policy process** in action.” (Schroeder, et al., in Farazmand 2001, 379)

- Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski (D-MD), chairman of the appropriations subcommittee demands a **General Accounting Office (GAO) study of the disaster relief system**, intending to open hearings for a **“complete overhaul of the system within 1 year.”** (Congressional Quarterly 1992). In September, she prods the GAO for a **second study of FEMA**. She also spearheads a requirement that **FEMA fund a study by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) of itself and the entire emergency system**. In early 1993, all 3 reports were issued, calling for a “major redesign of both FEMA and the system of federal emergency management response. (Schroeder, et al., in Farazmand 2001, 380).

“As the widespread criticisms and the subsequent investigation of federal emergency management policies following Hurricane Andrew showed, the **public expects government to respond swiftly and effectively** in emergencies and **has little tolerance when those expectations are not met.**” (Tierney 2001, 152)

- **1993: Federal Interagency Recovery Committee** is established.
 - This was precipitated by the Midwest Floods of 1993:
 - **Nine States receive Presidential Disaster Declarations.**
 - **Thousands of miles of nonfederal levees breached or overtopped. (Platt 1996, 50)**
 - **31,250 square miles flooded.**⁶³
 - **75 towns submerged.**
 - **\$15-20 billion in losses. (DOC 1994)**

“Unlike the earlier disasters. . . the governmental **response seemed to work quite well** during this situation. . . Officials from the Federal Emergency Management Agency were on hand from the beginning to provide technical assistance and support.

⁶³ Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee. 1994. *Sharing the Challenge: Floodplain Management into the 21st Century—A Blueprint for Change*, p. 6

“FEMA personnel never tried to take over the relief operations or supplant the activities of lower-level governmental personnel. Instead, they **acted in a supportive capacity**, working closely with other emergency management personnel to assess the extent of the damage and channel resources into the affected areas. As a result, **FEMA was praised for its responsiveness and leadership**. Overall, the entire government relief effort operated quite well. By the standards of both the disaster-stricken population and the governmental officials involved, the **recovery effort was highly successful.**”⁶⁴

- **1993: Congress repeals the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950**, Title II Authorized National Civil Defense Plans, via Public Law 103-337.
 - Drawing from the repealed Civil Defense Act, **Title VI is added to the Stafford Act, mandating All-Hazard Planning.**

“...The Federal government shall provide necessary direction, coordination, and guidance, and shall provide necessary assistance,...so that a comprehensive emergency preparedness system exists for all hazards.” (42 U.S.C., para 5195.)

“As a direct result of the disasters of the early 1990s, in particular the Midwest Floods of 1993, the U.S. **Congress directed FEMA to place its highest priority on working with State and local agencies to mitigate the impacts of future natural hazard events**. This marked a **fundamental shift in policy: rather than placing primary emphasis on response and recovery**, FEMA’s focus broadened to **incorporate mitigation as the foundation of emergency management.**” (FEMA 1997, *Multi Hazard...Risk Assessment*, xviii.)

- **1993: James Lee Witt is nominated by President Clinton to become the new FEMA Director.**
 - Director Witt had been the head of the Arkansas Emergency Management Agency when President Clinton had been the State Governor. Director Witt was the first FEMA Director with this kind of experience. (FEMA 1999, 2)

⁶⁴ Schneider, 1998. Pp 48-49. Citing William Claiborne (1992). “More Welcome than Disaster: For Once—in Midwest—FEMA is Relatively Well Received.” *Washington Post* (August 13): A-23 and Marshall Ingwerson (1993). “FEMA Is ‘Not Waiting’ for the Winds to Die Down.” *Christian Science Monitor* (September 1): 6.

- Director Witt soon:
 - Brings **Mitigation** to the **forefront** of FEMA activities.
 - **Reorganizes the Agency and creates a Mitigation Directorate.**⁶⁵
 - “Initiated sweeping **reforms that streamlined disaster relief and recovery operations...**” (FEMA 1999, 2).
 - Made **Customer Service** a FEMA priority. (FEMA 1999, 2)
- **1993:** Congress passes the **Hazard Mitigation and Relocation Act of 1993.**
 - In response to the 1993 Midwest floods, this legislation, for the first time, allowed FEMA to proactively reduce flood risk by increasing money for hazard mitigation.
 - The legislation allowed FEMA, for example, to purchase 10,000 homes and businesses in the Midwest floodplains and to remove this property from harm’s way.
- **By 1993, more than 70 requests for presidential declarations are received each year.**

“[T]here is a growing consensus that this **increase in defining natural disasters as “national” and calling for a national response** is due to the advent of ‘live,’ ‘action,’ and ‘on the scene’ **coverage by national media**; a related **need for presidents to appear to be ‘strong leaders** that take action in response to the needs of citizens; and **heightened politicization** (not necessarily partisan) of the disaster declaration and response process in general. One FEMA official emphasized the point to which things had gone by wryly remarking that, ‘. . . in Texas they want a declaration every time a cow pisses on a flat rock.’” (Schroeder, et al. in Farazmand 2001, 364)

 - Thus is evolving a “**camcorder policy process**” under which:

“. . . a **stopwatch is ticking as the public, through the eye of the media, watches** the developing response **and assesses** the speed with which the agencies deliver aid and support to the affected area.”

⁶⁵ FEMA. 1993. *Reorganization Announcement* (Memorandum). Washington, DC: October 18.

“The normal process of funneling aid and resources into the area are often seen as too slow or ‘bureaucratic,’ especially as **the media personalize the event by presenting interview after interview of individual victims and families bemoaning their lack of physical support within an atmosphere of personal and community shock. . . elected officials feel compelled to step forward and assume the ‘strong person’ role**, seeking to gain the political mantle of ‘leadership’ that can ‘jump start’ the presumably ineffective government bureaucracy.

“. . . the siren’s call of media coverage is a **tantalizing lure for any elected official, especially if one can project an image to a national audience**. This national audience potential fuels efforts to have the disaster escalated to a national level, and the device chosen for such escalation is a **presidential declaration, which is often followed by a presidential or vice presidential ‘inspection tour’ of the stricken area**. In our new media age, the national executive is often more than happy to oblige local and state officials.

“The nationalization of disasters is inextricably linked with the **expansion of the president’s role as a symbolic leader** and the related phenomenon of the **‘photo-op presidency.’** . . . Few events offer such potential for dramatic staging as a natural disaster, where the ‘chief executive officer’ can stand in the midst of rubble, offering assistance and compassion to the citizen victims on behalf of all the citizens of the nation. . . **Lost, though in the political theater starring the president as disaster hero, are all of the essential administrative and policy decisions** that must both precede and follow that moment.

“[T]oday’s presidents have the tools needed to do heroic deeds in the form of presidential declarations of disasters and release or emergency funds. These can be **dramatic and politically profitable if handled effectively.**” (Schroeder, et al., 366)

- **1995: President Clinton recognizes** the improved disaster work of **FEMA** in his **State of the Union Address**—attributed, in part, to his **reinvention of government efforts**.
- **1995: First National Mitigation Conference** is hosted by FEMA.
 - The conference is attended by 850 Federal, State and local emergency managers and others interested in hazard reduction.

- FEMA unveils its **National Mitigation Strategy**, which:
 - Provided a **conceptual framework** to reduce disaster losses.
 - Intended to engender **fundamental change in public perception** of hazard risk and mitigation.
 - Attempted to **demonstrate** that mitigation is the **most cost-effective and environmentally sound approach to reducing losses**.

“Mitigation must go from a little used word after a disaster strikes to a household word 365 days a year.” (Witt 1995)

- **1996: Congress passes Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act** (also known as **(Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act)**, and FY 1997 Defense Authorization Bill **Legislation:**
 - **Provides DoD funding** to enhance Federal/State/local capability to respond to **NBC (WMD) Terrorism**.
 - **Precipitated by:**
 - World Trade Center Bombing, NYC (1993).
 - Tokyo, Japan Subway Sarin Gas Attack (1993).
 - Murrah Federal Office Building Bombing, Oklahoma City, OK (April 19, 1995).
 - **Other Results:**
 - **Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism**, June 1995. (EPN, 10Dec98, 1989)

(Defines roles and responsibilities of key agencies in a terrorist incident response, with particular reference to crisis management and consequence management response activities.)
 - President Clinton signs **Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act** (P.L. 104-132).

(Criminalizes participation in international terrorist activities on U.S. soil and makes fundraising for a terrorist organization a criminal offense.)

- **Terrorism Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan, 1997.** (Rubin/Tanali 1999)
- **1996: The Federal Response Plan is updated.**
- In more recent years **emergency management concepts at the Federal level have changed** in response to the **growing challenges from natural and technological disasters and continual innovations in disaster mitigation and response.**
- **1997: FEMA initiates Project Impact:**
 - Primary focus is the creation of **disaster resistant communities** in every State of the Union.
- **1998: FEMA is praised** in a study of “**reinvention**” efforts.

“... **management reforms** within FEMA have had a **positive impact** on the agency’s internal organization and operations. More importantly... the **reinvention of FEMA has also improved the functioning of the nation’s entire emergency management system.**” (Schneider, 1998. p. 1)
- **1998 (May 22)** President Clinton signs **Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) 62 “Combating Terrorism and 63 “Critical Infrastructure Protection.”**
- **1999: Federal Response Plan is revised** to ensure consistency with current policy guidance, integrate recovery and mitigation functions into the response structure, and describe relationships to other emergency operations plans.
- **2001 (February):** Joseph Allbaugh is confirmed FEMA Director.
- **2001 (February 8):** H.R. 525, “**Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001**” introduced—amends Stafford Act to include **acts of terrorism or other catastrophic events within its definition of “major disaster”** for purposes of authorized disaster relief.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Thomas E. Baldwin. 2002. *History of FEMA Consequence Management Planning for Terrorist Incidents*. Argonne IL. p. 11

- **2001 (June 15): FEMA reorganizes; the Office of National Preparedness is established. The Planning, Exercise & Evaluation Division is established within the Readiness, Response and Recovery Directorate to work with State and local governments.**⁶⁷
- **2001 (September 11): Terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.** President issues disaster declaration for New York City within 6 hours after Governor Pataki's State disaster declaration (approximately 6 hours after the initial attack at 8:43 am, EDT).⁶⁸
- **2001 (October 8):** President Bush signs **Executive Order 13288 establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council** to be headed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. **Former Pennsylvania Governor, Tom Ridge** is sworn in as **first Director of Homeland Security.**⁶⁹
- **2003 (March):** FEMA joins 22 other federal agencies, programs and offices in the **Department of Homeland Security (DHS).**⁷⁰

“Today, FEMA is one of four branches [directorates] of DHS. About 2,500 full-time employees in the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate are supplemented by more than 5,000 stand-by disaster reservists.”⁷¹

- The **Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate** of DHS, which is to oversee preparedness training and coordinate disaster response brings together:
 - Federal Emergency Management Agency.
 - Strategic National Stockpile.
 - National Disaster Medical System.
 - Nuclear Incident Response Team.
 - Domestic Emergency Support Teams (Department of Justice).
 - National Domestic Preparedness Office⁷².

⁶⁷ Baldwin, 2002. p. 13

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Baldwin, 2002. p. 14

⁷⁰ *About FEMA*. “FEMA History.” www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² DHS Organization. “DHS Agencies.” www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display/?theme-13

- **However:**

“DHS’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate is changing its name to “FEMA” because people know what it stands for, if not every word behind the initials.

“EP&R sounded clunky and confused people, Michael D. Brown, DHS Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, allowed during a break in a House Appropriates Homeland Security Subcommittee hearing. FEMA, he said, ‘is the brand name people recognize.’

“But, he added, department officials aren’t quite sure what the new FEMA will actually stand for. With the addition of some nuclear response, public health and Justice Department programs, the agency has expanded well beyond its traditional role of responding to natural disasters. So, Brown said, the administration may craft a new name around the old abbreviation. Or, it might leave the old name in place.

“Brown also told the subcommittee the department will reorganize the new FEMA into four divisions. Specifics on the reorganization will be available ‘soon,’ he said, but the four divisions will be responsible for preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery.”⁷³

⁷³ David Clarke. *FYI*. “Nevermind.” Congressional Quarterly, May 1, 3001.

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